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ABSTRACT
We evaluate Richard Posner's famous hypothesis that common law converges to efficient legal rules
using a model of precedent setting by appellate judges. Following legal realists, we assume that
judicial decisions are subject to personal biases, and that changing precedent is costly to judges. We
consider separately the evolution of precedent under judicial overruling of previous decisions, as
well as under distinguishing cases based on new material dimensions. Convergence to efficient legal
rules occurs only under very special circumstances, but the evolution of precedent over time is on












  In his Economic Analysis of Law (2003, 1
st ed. 1973), Richard Posner raises a question: in a 
common law system, does judge-made law converge to efficient legal rules?   Put differently, do 
precedents converge to fixed rules, and if so, are these rules efficient?  Posner hypothesizes that 
common law tends toward efficiency.   Rubin (1977) and Priest (1977) suggest that disputes 
involving inefficient legal rules are more likely to be taken to court rather than settled, leading to 
the replacement of such rules over time.   These articles do not focus on how judges actually make 
decisions.   In this paper, we model the evolution of precedents through a series of judicial 
decisions, and examine its consequences for the convergence and efficiency of legal rules.   
  The doctrine of stare decisis, of deference to precedent, is a crucial feature of common law 
(e.g., Hayek 1960, Stone 1985, Posner 2003).  Respect for precedents gives common law its 
stability and predictability.  In addition, it enables appellate courts to communicate with, and 
therefore constrain, lower level courts more effectively (Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson 2002). 
At the same time, the possibility of judges changing legal rules allows the law to evolve, to adjust to 
new circumstances, and therefore to become ever more efficient over time.   Posner (2003) 
recognizes that such legal evolution is most effective when judges maximize efficiency.  But even 
when they do not, and differ in their approaches to law, a key evolutionary argument still sees the 
common law as evolving toward ever better rules.   “The eccentricities of judges balance one 
another.  One judge looks at problems from the point of view of history, another from that of 
philosophy, another from that of social utility, one is a formalist, another a latitudinarian, one is 
timorous of change, another dissatisfied with the present; out of the attrition of diverse minds there 
is beaten something which has a constancy and uniformity and average value greater than its 
component elements” (Cardozo 1921, p. 177).  Thus even if judges do not maximize efficiency, 
evolution selects better legal rules.   
    To assess these views of the evolution of common law, we present a new model of 
precedent formation by appellate judges.  Our model relies on two assumptions.  First, following   3
the legal realism literature (e.g., Cohen 1935, Frank 1930, Radin 1925, Stone 1985) and the 
theoretical work of Gennaioli (2004), we assume that judges hold biases favoring different types of 
disputants, and that these biases vary across the population of judges.   Frank (1930, p. 28) defines 
bias as the ideas and beliefs that come from judges’ past experiences or philosophies.   For example, 
some judges might believe in literal interpretation of contracts, others in interpreting contracts so as 
to promote efficiency, and still others in interpreting contracts against the drafter (Posner 2004b).  
Frank (1930) and Radin (1925) go so far as to say that judges decide the cases backwards: they 
figure out what outcome is just from their point of view, and then find legal arguments to support 
their conclusions.   
Many legal scholars accept the importance of judicial bias for rulings on politically sensitive 
issues (e.g., Pinello 1999, Rowland and Carp 1996, Revesz 1997, Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman 
2004).   Judges also differ sharply in their sentencing decisions for a given crime (Partridge and 
Eldridge 1974).  But judges may also have preferences over the outcomes of commercial disputes: 
they may favor the rich or the poor, the government or individuals, insurance companies or accident 
victims.  As Posner (2004a, p. 14) – echoing Frank (1930) -- writes about federal district judges:  
“But [deciding a particular case in a particular way might increase the judge’s utility] by advancing 
a political or ideological goal, economizing on the judge’s time and effort, inviting commendation 
from people whom the judge admires, benefiting the local community, getting the judge’s name in 
the newspaper, pleasing a spouse or other family member or a friend, galling a lawyer whom the 
judge dislikes, expressing affection for or hostility toward one of the parties – the list goes on and 
on.”    One piece of data on the importance of judicial preferences in commercial disputes, and the 
consequent unpredictability of judicial decisions, is the sharp share price reactions that companies 
experience on the dates judges issue decisions (Haslem 2004).   
Judicial bias is related to the idea that judges may be swayed by external forces, including 
political influence, intimidation, or bribes.  This alternative assumption has been used to investigate 
legal systems both historically and in developing countries (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002, Glaeser,   4
Scheinkman, and Shleifer 2003).  However, to understand the evolution of common law in a 
developed modern economy, the assumption of judicial bias appears to be more appropriate.  
  Second, also following Radin (1925) and Posner (2003, 2004a), we assume that changing 
precedent is personally costly to judges: it requires extra investigation of facts, extra writing, extra 
work of persuading colleagues when judges sit in panels, extra risk of being criticized, and so on.  
“Judges are people and the economizing of mental effort is a characteristic of people, even if 
censorious persons call it by a less fine name” (Radin 1925, p. 362).  The assumption that, other 
things equal, judges would rather not change the law implies that only the judges who disagree with 
the current legal rule strongly enough actually change it.   Posner (2003, p. 544) sees what he calls 
“judicial preference for leisure” as a source of stability in the law; we revisit this issue.  
  Using a model relying on these two assumptions, we examine the evolution of legal rules in 
the case of a simple tort: a dog bites a man (e.g., Landes and Posner 1987).   We consider separately 
two types of revision of precedents: overruling and distinguishing.  By overruling we mean the 
discarding and replacement of a prevailing legal rule by a new one.  Rubin (1977), Priest (1977), 
and Posner (2003) seem to have this model of precedent change in mind.  By distinguishing we 
mean the introduction of a new legal rule that endorses the existing precedent, but adds a new 
material dimension to adjudication, and holds that the judicial decision must depend on both the 
previously established dimension and the new one. Distinguishing cases is perhaps the central 
mechanism, or leeway, through which the law evolves despite binding precedents (Stone 1985).  
But the efficiency of this process has not received much analytical attention.  So we ask whether the 
evolution of precedents through either overruling or distinguishing leads to convergence, whether 
such convergence is to efficient legal rules, and what factors render legal change more efficient. 
Our argument is best illustrated with an example, which simplifies the model in significant 
ways.  Consider the evolution of legal rules governing the liability of an owner of a dog that bit a 
bystander.  Suppose for concreteness that there are only two material dimensions of the dispute: the 
dog’s breed (a proxy for its aggressiveness), and whether the bystander provoked it.  Suppose   5
further that there are only two kinds of dogs in the world: pit bulls and golden retrievers, and two 
kinds of provocation: a kick or none.  Suppose finally that the first best efficient liability rule calls 
for liability of all pit bull owners, with or without a provocation, since pit bulls are so dangerous 
that their owners should efficiently guard against the risks of their biting even after a provocation.  
However, the first best rule calls for liability of golden retriever owners only in the event of no 
provocation, since golden retrievers are happy and peaceful animals.    
  To illustrate our ideas, consider judges distinguishing cases.  Suppose that the first case 
comes along, and that a man is bitten by a golden retriever with no provocation.  Suppose that the 
issue of provocation does not even come up before the judge.  However, we have a biased judge, 
who thinks that dogs are dangerous and unsavory pests, as are their owners, and establishes the rule 
that all dog owners are liable when dogs bite men.   This, as we assumed, is not an efficient rule. 
  Suppose that, after a while, perhaps with many other cases of dog bites being adjudicated 
according to the established precedent of strict liability, a case comes up of a golden retriever biting 
a man who kicked it.  Suppose, again for concreteness, that the judge who handles the case is of one 
of three types: anti-dog like the first judge, efficiency-oriented, or pro-dog, believing that all dogs 
are quiet pets and only bite men who deserve it.   If the judge is anti-dog, he does nothing, and 
simply lets the precedent stand, without addressing the issue of provocation.  In this case, this issue 
might perhaps be addressed by future judges.  Alternatively, the same anti-dog judge can argue that 
he considered the provocation, but deemed it immaterial, in which case he effectively solidifies the 
inefficient precedent in which owners of all dogs are liable regardless of provocation, forever.     
  If the judge is efficiency-oriented, he recognizes that it is a better rule to hold owners of 
provoked golden retrievers not liable, and so introduces provocation as a new material dimension.  
This judge writes that the prior court has neglected to consider that sometimes golden retrievers are 
provoked, in which case it is not efficient to hold their owners liable.  This judge clarifies the law 
entirely: owners of provoked golden retrievers avoid liability, all other dog owners are liable in the 
event of a bite.   This is the case of Posner’s efficiency-maximizing judges.     6
  But suppose the judge is a misanthrope.  He grabs the opportunity to introduce a material 
new dimension, and to rule that the precedent applies only to the cases of no provocation.  He 
accordingly revises the legal rule to say that owners of all breeds are liable in the absence of a 
provocation (so he respects stare decisis), but not liable otherwise.  With this new rule, not only do 
the owners of provoked golden retrievers now -- efficiently -- escape liability, but the owners of 
provoked pit bulls – inefficiently – escape liability as well.  In fact, the social cost of the new rule, 
which wrongly holds the owners of provoked pit bulls not liable, could be much greater than that of 
the old rule, which wrongly holds the owners of provoked golden retrievers liable.  Distinguishing 
the case and introducing a new material dimension by a biased judge, in this instance, leads the law 
away from efficiency.  And to the extent that stare decisis is respected and material dimensions are 
exhausted by breed and provocation, the inefficient rule is the end of the evolutionary process.  
  In this discussion, we have not mentioned the judge’s cost of changing the precedent relative 
to his benefit of doing so.  If it is somewhat costly to change the legal rule, only the misanthrope 
may change the original precedent, since his preferred rule is far away from it.  In contrast, the 
efficiency-oriented judge may not be willing to incur a cost just to obtain a small efficiency gain 
from eliminating the liability of the owners of provoked golden retrievers.  Now the result is even 
worse than before: efficient rule changes do not take place, and only inefficient ones are 
implemented by extremist judges.  Selection works the wrong way. 
  Of course, a fuller evaluation of the evolution of the precedent requires the consideration of 
all the different paths of change in the law, as well as a separate treatment of overruling and 
distinguishing.  But two general principles stand out.  First, legal change enables judges to reaffirm 
their own biases, and to undo the biases of their predecessors.  Second, such change occurs more 
often when judges´ preferences are polarized because judges are more likely to be in strong 
disagreement with the current precedent.  Putting these principles to work, we find that, in general, 
convergence to efficient legal rules occurs under very limited circumstances.  With overruling, 
convergence may not occur at all, and the legal rules may fluctuate between extremes.  One   7
exception is the case where efficiency-oriented judges are activist, while heavily biased judges are 
not, in which case the law does converge to efficiency.  With distinguishing, convergence is more 
likely, but the conditions for full efficiency are implausibly strict.  Now judicial bias in not the only 
force undermining efficiency: because of the sequential order in which new dimensions are 
introduced into the law, even the rules established by efficiency oriented judges may be suboptimal 
from the long-run standpoint.  Still, distinguishing has the virtue of bringing new data to dispute 
resolution.  When the costs of changing the law are not too high, this informational benefit renders 
legal evolution on average beneficial, confirming Cardozo’s views. 
  The next section outlines our model of legal precedent.  Section 3 describes the efficient 
legal rules in that model.   Section 4 presents a model of judicial overruling of past precedents. 
Sections 5 and 6 deal with the more interesting case in which judges distinguish cases and introduce 
new material dimensions into adjudication.  Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. A Model of Legal Precedent 
There are two parties, O and V, and a dog.  The dog bit victim V, who seeks to recover 
damages from O, the dog’s owner.  The dog was not on a leash, so in order to assess O’s liability 
one should determine whether O breached the duty of care (in which case he is liable) or did not (in 
which case he is not liable). 
Let  NP P  be the probability that the dog bites V if O does not take precautions (he does not 
put it on a leash) and  P P  the probability that the dog bites V if precautions are taken.  O prefers not 
to take precautions because he does not want to buy a leash, dislikes limiting the dog’s freedom, or 
simply does not want to sweat to keep the dog quiet.  Let C be the cost of precautions for O.   
The Hand formula holds that O has a duty of care (is liable) whenever C P P P NP ≥ − , i.e., 
when the reduction in the probability of a bite (weighted by harm, here assumed to equal 1) more   8
than offsets the cost of precautions to O.  In contrast, O has no duty of care (is not liable) 
if C P P P NP < − , because precautions cost more than they yield. 
Many circumstances determine whether O was careless.  The dog’s aggressiveness, the 
extent to which V provoked it, or the place where O and his dog walked may all influence the 
probability of a bite.  We assume that two empirical dimensions – the aggressiveness of the dog and 
V´s provocation – determine liability, i.e. constitute material dimensions in this legal dispute. 
Variable  [] 1 , 0 ∈ a  measures the dog’s aggressiveness.  More aggressive dogs have larger 
values of a; a dog with  0 = a  is extremely peaceful (a golden retriever) and less likely to bite V than 
a dog with  1 = a  (a pit bull).  Variable  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ q ,  where q stands for V´ s quietness , measures the 
extent to which V provoked the dog.  If 0 = q , V outrageously provoked the dog; if 1 = q , V was 
maximally quiet.  We assume that a and q are independently and uniformly distributed over the 
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where  P C P ∆ > > ∆ .  Thus, O is optimally liable if and only if 1 ≥ + q a .  Owners of violent dogs 
are optimally liable if V’s provocation was not egregious, owners of peaceful dogs may still be 
liable as long as V has not provoked them at all ( 1 = q ). 
  In general, the social benefit of the leash is a function  ) , ( q a P ∆  increasing in a and q.  We 
assume that it only depends on a+q, and that it “jumps” at a+q=1.  We could allow for more 
general functions, but our assumptions conveniently clarify the analysis of legal change and its 
impact on welfare.  The first restriction makes a and q symmetric for determining liability, which 
allows us to isolate the effect of legal change per se, abstracting from the specific nature of the 
dimension introduced into the law.  The second restriction allows us to separate the probabilities of 
the different errors induced by a particular legal rule from their welfare cost.   9
A legal rule in this environment attaches a legal consequence (O liable, O not liable) to 
every possible situation, defined as a combination of a and q.  The legal rule specifies all the 
circumstances  () q a,  in which O does or does not have a duty of care (i.e. when  P NP P P −  is 
estimated to be greater than C ).  In other words, a legal rule puts substantive content into Hand’s 
formula by specifying how the incremental probability of an accident must be determined as a 
function of a and q.  Different legal rules reflect different notions of how  P NP P P −  ought to be 
determined from the empirical attributes of a case. 
We restrict the attention to “threshold rules”.  A simple “threshold rule” uses only one 
dimension, say a, and specifies a threshold A such that O is held liable if and only if his dog is more 
aggressive than A (i.e.,  A a ≥ ).  A two-dimensional threshold rule – using both a and q -- is defined 
by three thresholds A,  0 Q  and  1 Q  such that O is held liable either if  A a ≤  but 0 Q q ≥ , or if  A a >  
but 1 Q q ≥ .   Figure 1 shows a generic two-dimensional threshold rule in the (a, q) space: 
    
In Figure 1, O is held liable in regions denoted by L, but non liable in those denoted by NL.  
Relative to a one-dimensional rule, a two-dimensional rule allows for liability of owners of peaceful 
dogs ( A a ≤ ) whom V did not provoke ( 0 Q q ≥ ), and to hold not liable owners of aggressive dogs 
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By focusing on threshold rules, we rule out a perfect (or first best) rule, holding O liable 
whenever 1 ≥ + q a .   In reality, legal rules often take the form of threshold rules for reasons 
presumably related to enforcement costs, since they do not require judges to ascertain the exact 
values of a and q, but only whether certain thresholds on each of the elements had been crossed.  
For instance, while under the rule of Figure 1 the knowledge that  0 Q q >  suffices to hold O liable, 
this is not the case under the perfect rule, which requires a much more precise (and presumably 
costly) verification of the facts (q and a). 
Before calculating efficient threshold rules, we describe how judges set rules in our model of 
precedent.  When initially no existing rule deals with dog bites, we assume that the only issue that 
comes up at trial is the aggressiveness of the dog.  As a result, the judge adjudicating the dispute for 
the first time sets the legal rule by choosing the first threshold on a, which we call  1 A .   Owners of 
dogs more aggressive than  1 A  are held liable; owners of dogs less aggressive than 1 A are not.    
This specification of judicial decisions is an intermediate way of dealing with precedents.  
One can alternatively assume that the first judge sets a broad precedent, in which he considers the 
hypothetical issue of provocation even if does not arise in the specific dispute, and maps out owner 
liability on the whole (a, q) space.  Under this specification, the law converges immediately, and we 
cannot talk about judges distinguishing cases; only replacing broad precedents by overruling.  One 
can also imagine a judge setting a very narrow precedent, whereby instead of establishing an 
aggressiveness threshold for liability, he only makes a decision with respect to the specific breed of 
dog  before him.  In this case, there will presumably be a whole collection of narrow judicial 
decisions, with judges filling in gaps according to their biases, before some threshold 
aggressiveness level is arrived at.   At that point, a judge who is unhappy with the existing cutoff of 
aggressiveness must change the rule.  With such narrow precedents, legal evolution is slower, but 
the issues we discuss in this paper eventually arise as well.     11
Once the initial precedent is set, a judge dealing with the same issue later can change the 
rule.   We consider two different models of stare decisis.  In the first model, which we call 
overruling, judges discard  1 A  and replace it with a new rule  2 A .  Stare decisis only binds in so far 
as it is costly for the judge to change the precedent.  In the second model, which we call 
distinguishing, the second judge does not assault stare decisis with respect to a,  but can still 
radically change the law by introducing the additional dimension q into adjudication, i.e. by setting 
0 Q  and  1 Q .  Effectively, the judge rules that the previous precedent is incomplete and applies to 
only some of the cases in the (a, q) space, but not others.  To take an extreme example of the power 
of distinguishing, if the first judge establishes a strict liability rule with  1 A = 0, the second judge can 
reverse it completely by setting  0 Q  =  1 Q  = 1 and eliminating owner liability entirely (by saying that 
liability exists only when there is absolutely no provocation).  In this model, precedent evolves 
through the introduction by judges of new material dimensions (q in this case) into the law.  The 
English view of precedent contemplated only distinguishing as a source of legal change, at least 
until recently.   In the United States, overruling coexists with distinguishing.  To clarify the core 
properties of these two strategies of precedent change, as opposed to the judges’ choice among 
them, we consider the cases of overruling and distinguishing separately.   
We further assume that, for both overruling or distinguishing, a judge changing the legal 
rule incurs a personal effort cost k, regardless of how he changes the initial precedent.  We take k  to 
be a fixed cost, independent of the magnitude of precedent change.  We could alternatively assume 
that more radical precedent changes entail higher personal costs.  Some of the results of that model 
are different, but our broad qualitative conclusions continue to hold.  We also maintain the view that 
stare decisis prevents the introduction of arbitrary and irrelevant dimensions into the law.   
Model timing: t = 0: The first judge sets the rule by establishing the aggressiveness 
threshold  1 A .  This initial precedent guides adjudication until a judge (if any) changes the rule at 
some 
' t .  What happens at t=t´ and after depends very much on which model we are in.   12
Overruling: The judge changing  1 A  sets a new rule  2 A , possibly giving rise to a new round 
of precedent change.    In this model, the issue of provocation never arises. 
Distinguishing: The judge changing the rule sets two provocation thresholds  0 Q  and 1 Q .  In 
this case, the law is permanently fixed, as there are no further material dimensions to introduce. 
In Section 4, we study the judges’ objectives in changing the law, as well as their costs of 
doing so.  But first, we investigate the efficient – welfare maximizing – rules that provide the 
normative benchmark for our analysis of legal change and judge made law. 
 
3. Optimal Legal Rules 
Legal rules affect social welfare – defined as the sum of O’s and V’s utility – by changing 
the precautions taken by dog owners.  The likelihood of damages and the fine on O when he is 
found liable shape his decision to put the dog on a leash.  We assume that fines are always set high 
enough to enforce precautions whenever the law dictates that they must be taken.  First best welfare, 
achieved under optimal precautions (i.e., O puts the dog on a leash whenever 1 ≥ + q a ), is equal to: 
(2)      C P W
B F ) 2 / 1 ( ) 2 / 1 (
. . − ∆ − = , 
where the probability of a bite when precautions are taken is normalized to 0.  In half the cases, 
precautions are not efficient and the parties bear the extra risk  P ∆  of the dog biting the man; in the 
other half, precautions are efficient and cost C to society. 
    Adjudication cannot achieve such high welfare since threshold rules necessarily induce 
judicial errors.  If O is held liable but 1 < + q a , excessive precautions are taken; if O is held not 
liable but 1 ≥ + q a , O’s level of care is too low.  Let  ) Pr( NL L  and  ) Pr( L NL  be the probabilities 
that O is erroneously held liable and not liable, respectively, under a particular legal rule.  The loss 
of social welfare relative to the first best under this rule is equal to: 
(3)     
over under NL L L NL Λ + Λ = Λ ) Pr( ) Pr(    13
C P
under − ∆ = Λ  is the social cost of under-precautions when O is mistakenly held not liable, 
P C
over ∆ − = Λ  is the social cost of over-precautions when O is erroneously held liable.  In our 
analysis, these costs of over- and under-precautions are constant, and we focus on how different 
legal rules affect the likelihood of different mistakes in adjudication.  
For concreteness, we assume that under-precautions are the greater evil to avoid:  
 
Assumption 1: 1 / ≤ ≡ Λ Λ λ
under over . 
 
  Figure 2 represents both the first best. and the one-dimensional rule, in the  ) , ( q a  space.  
Under the first best, O is liable above the diagonal but not below.  The vertical bold line represents 
the one-dimensional threshold legal rule, A, which holds O liable if and only if  A a ≥ .  
        
The one-dimensional threshold rule  holds  O mistakenly liable in region  NL L  and 
mistakenly not liable in region  L NL .  For a given A, the probabilities of these errors are given by 
2 ) 1 )( 2 / 1 ( ) Pr( A NL L − =  and 
2 ) 2 / 1 ( ) Pr( A L NL = .   The corresponding loss of social welfare is: 
(4)     
over under A A A Λ − + Λ = Λ
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If A is the initial precedent, social losses are ) (A Λ  – an average of over and under-precautions costs 
under the error probabilities that A induces. The larger is A (the more the initial rule favors O), the 
larger is the loss from under-precautions.  Over-precaution costs increase as A gets smaller. 
  Figure 3 illustrates the two dimensional legal rule with thresholds A,  0 Q  and 1 Q .  Here O is 
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The social loss from the use of the two-dimensional threshold legal rule is given by: 
(5)  [ ] [ ]
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By minimizing (4) with respect to  A and (5) with respect to  1 0, , Q Q A ,  we find the optimal initial 
precedent and the optimal two-dimensional rule.  
 
Proposition 1: i) The optimal one-dimensional legal rule (initial precedent) is given by 
  [ ] ) / (   1 / ) / (
under over under over
L A Λ Λ + Λ Λ = . 
               ii) The optimal two-dimensional legal rule is given by 
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The optimal initial precedent  L A  responds to social costs.  The larger is the relative cost of over-
precautions (the larger is ) / (
under over Λ Λ ), the more lenient is the optimal rule (the larger is L A ). 
This is also true for the optimal two-dimensional thresholds  F A ,  F Q , 0  and  F Q , 1 .  The 
optimal legal rule is more lenient toward O, the larger is the relative cost of over-precautions 
(
under over Λ Λ / ). Going back to Figure 3, if the cost of under-precautions is very large, the optimal O Q  
and  1 Q  should be small to keep  L NL  -- the region where careless owners are held not liable -- 
small.  Conversely, for larger over-precautions cost, the optimal  O Q  and  1 Q  should be raised so as 
to reduce the size of  NL L , the region where O is mistakenly held liable. 
The efficiency of a rule generally depends on two factors: its overall imprecision 
) Pr( ) Pr( NL L L NL + , and the ratio of different errors  ) Pr( / ) Pr( NL L L NL . The optimal initial 
precedent and the optimal two-dimensional rule fare equally well in terms of this second factor (i.e. 
they induce the same  ) Pr( / ) Pr( NL L L NL ),  but the two-dimensional rule is more precise, and thus 
more efficient.  2 / 1 = F A  yields the full benefit of extra information.  For extreme  F A  (1 or 0), the 
added dimension q is worthless: a single threshold on q ( 0 Q  or 1 Q ) describes liability over the entire 
(a, q) space, just like in a one-dimensional rule. 
With the results of this section in mind, we can move on to study judicial lawmaking under 
the two postulated forms of stare decisis.  Our analysis is driven by three main questions.  First, we  
ask whether there is a tendency for the process of precedent change to converge to a decision rule 
limiting the impact of judicial idiosyncrasies.  Second, we scrutinize Posner’s proposition that not 
only do the common law rules converge, but also that they converge to the efficient ones.  By 
efficiency we will mean ex ante efficiency, before judge types are revealed.  Third, we ask more 
broadly whether, aside from the question of convergence, legal change itself is beneficial from the 
social viewpoint.   To this end, we lay out some circumstances under which this is the case.  
   16
4. How Judges Shape the Law 
  Like social welfare, the utility of a judge settling a dispute between O and V depends on the 
precision of the rule and on the ratio of different mistakes.  However, we assume that a judge’s 
objective diverges from efficiency because of his bias, which reflects his preference for V or O and 
induces him to sacrifice optimal precision for a pattern of mistakes more favorable to the preferred 
party.  Specifically, we assume that the utility of judge j is given by: 
(6)      ) Pr( ) Pr( , , NL L L NL U j O j V j β β − − =  
Judges dislike making mistakes, but they do not dislike the two types of mistakes equally.  j O, β  and 
j V, β  ( 0 , , , ≥ j O j V β β ) capture the preference of judge j for O and V, respectively: the larger is  j O, β , 
the more he is eager to hold O not liable, the larger is  j V, β , the more he is willing to hold O liable. 
  Under the assumed utility function, judges are unhappy with any mistake they make (albeit 
differentially for different errors).  Thus, if we did not restrict attention to threshold rules and 
allowed for all two-dimensional rules, even biased judges would pick the first best one (the 
diagonal).   This judicial aversion to making mistakes leads to judicial self-restraint that is crucial 
for our results: even a judge heavily biased against dog owners would not introduce the most anti-
owner liability rule available if this rule leads to mistakes he can avoid, including mistakes favoring 
bite victims.  Such preferences allow us to emphasize – in line with the legal realists – that judicial 
bias is more problematic in the presence of uncertainty, when judges trade off different errors.   But 
we do not model the kind of favoritism where the judge rules against dog owners even when he 
knows for sure that they should not be efficiently held liable.   
  In our specification of judicial preferences, a judge’s utility depends on the expected 
outcome arising from the application of a given rule, not from the resolution of a particular case.  
Such a judge would consider replacing a legal rule he dislikes even if the outcome of the specific 
case before him is the same under the new rule.  A judge cares about having a rule in place that 
meets his idea of justice, rather than about delivering a desired outcome in a specific dispute before   17
him.   This assumption is particularly appropriate for appellate judges, who  establish legal rules 
rather than resolve specific disputes. 
The judge is assumed to ignore the possibility that the rule he establishes will be changed in 
the future.  In particular, he does not act strategically with respect to future judges.  This assumption 
can be relaxed,  although at the cost of increased analytical complexity, and we believe our basic 
results would be preserved.  One way to justify the present framework is by noting that precedents 
change relatively rarely, and therefore a judge discounting the future may not put much value on the 
effect of future legal change. 
There is a measure 1 of judges, who can be of three types: share γ  of judges are Unbiased, 
with bias  λ β β = j V j O , , /  reflecting social welfare; the rest is equally divided among Pro-O, with 
bias  λπ β β = j V j O , , /  and Pro-V, with bias  π λ β β / / , , = j V j O . Parameter π  ( 1 ≥ π ), measures the 
polarization of judges’ preferences: with a higherπ , the preferences of Pro-O and Pro-V judges are 
more extreme (there is more disagreement among them). We assume that all judges have the same 
preference intensity and normalize it to 1 ( 1 , , = + j O j V β β ,  j ∀ ). 
 
Initial Precedent 
The first judge adjudicating a dispute between O and V establishes the initial precedent.  We 
assume that, in this dispute, the issue of provocation never arises (and the judge does not entertain 
legal rules taking provocation into account unless that issue arises in the dispute).  To resolve this 
dispute, the judge selects a threshold A to maximize:  




1 , 1 ) 1 ( ) 2 / 1 ( ) 2 / 1 ( ) ( A A A U O V − − − = β β  
1 , V β  and  1 , O β  parameterize the bias of the initial judge.  Define  1 , 1 , 1 / V O β β β =  as the Pro-O bias of 
this judge.  Minimizing the objective above, we find that: 
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The subscript indicates that  1 A  is the initial precedent set with Pro-O bias 1 β .  The result is 
intuitive: the more Pro-O is the judge, the more lenient he is (the higher is  1 A ).  1 A  coincides with 
the efficient initial precedent L A  only if
under over Λ Λ = = / 1 λ β , i.e. if the judge’s bias toward O 
reflects the relative social cost of over-precautions. 
Under  1 A , social losses are given by  ) ( 1 A Λ .  Given the variety of judges’ preferences, there 
is no reason to presume that  1 A  is set efficiently, i.e. to minimize  ) ( 1 A Λ .  If the case ends up in 
front of a Pro-O judge ( λ β > 1 ), too many aggressive dogs roam and bite with impunity; if instead 
it ends up in front of a Pro-V judge ( λ β < 1 ) too many peaceful dogs are put on a leash. 
 
Overruling  
Depending on 1 β , the initial precedent may turn out to be severely inefficient.  Still, this bias 
may be corrected through the change of precedent.  As Cardozo (1921) might suggest, if the initial 
rule is very biased in one direction (say Pro-O), the successive intervention by a Pro-V judge would 
modify the law by tempering its initial bias with the opposite one. 
Suppose that precedent  i A  is in place, and judge j takes the initiative to change the law.  He 











where  j V j O j , , / β β β =  is the Pro-O bias of judge j.  To see if judge j in fact changes the law, we 
must consider his personal incentive to do so, as judges may be unwilling to bear the effort and 
other costs of legal change.  Judge j changes the law only if: 
(10)   k A U A U i j j j ≥ − ) ( ) ( 
i.e. when the cost to the judge of changing the law is smaller than its benefit.  Using the judge’s 
utility function, we find that judge j overrules the precedent when:   19












   
The smaller is the cost k, the higher the chance that a judge changes the law.  Clearly, if there are no 
costs of overruling, the judge prefers to change the law and set the rule  j A  that reflects his own 
bias. Thus, for  0 = k , judges always overrule precedent, creating expected social losses of 
[] ) ( i j A E Λ , where the expectation is taken over all judge types.  But how do judges with a positive k 
react to precedent?  Since judges regain discretion through overruling, they are more activist when 
the prevailing legal rule is further away from their preferred one (see the numerator of eq. (11)).  
This is more likely to be the case if judges´ preferences are more polarized (π  is higher).  In this 
way, the extent of disagreement among judges determines the long run configuration of precedent. 
The case of  1 = λ  illustrates this intuition.  Now there exist two levels of polarization 
2 1 π π ≤  such that judicial behavior can be summarized in Table 1.  The boxes in the table report the 
circumstances when a judge j changes the legal rule he inherited from i.  Three patterns of behavior 
emerge.  First, judges never change the initial rule of an adjudicator of  the same type. Second, 
judges´ behavior is symmetric: if judge j overrules  i A , then  judge i overrules  j A . Third, more 
judges change the law as π  increases. 
      Judge i 
Judge j 
Pro-O Unbiased  Pro-V 
Pro-O  Never  2 π π ≥   1 π π ≥  
Unbiased  2 π π ≥   Never  2 π π ≥  
Pro-V  1 π π ≥   2 π π ≥   Never 
 
      T a b l e   1 .  
Since a judge changes precedent to set a rule reflecting his preferences, there is no need for him to 
repudiate a rule established by someone with the same views.  Judges are also reluctant to change   20
the law when their views differ little relative to the cost of overruling ( 1 π π < ). At intermediate 
levels of polarization ( [ ) 2 1,π π π ∈ ),  Pro-O and Pro-V judges overrule each other.   Unbiased 
judges stop being passive when  2 π π ≥  as they begin to overrule extremists. 
  The polarization of judicial preferences determines the ultimate configuration of judge-made 
law.  For low polarization ( 1 π π < ), precedent does not change from  1 A .  When polarization is 
intermediate ( [ ) 2 1,π π π ∈ ), precedent oscillates between Pro-O and Pro-V rules unless an 
Unbiased judge sets the initial rule, which then becomes permanent.  At high levels of polarization, 
every judge pursues legal change.   Overruling is highly problematic for convergence. 
Little changes for  1 < λ .  Since now Pro-O judges disagree with Unbiased ones more than 
the Pro-V do, there is a  3 π  such that for  [ ) 3 2,π π π ∈  Pro-O judges overrule Unbiased judges even 
if Pro-V ones stay passive.  Convergence is only achieved for very high k’s.  In that case, regardless 
of polarization of judicial preferences, no judge ever changes the law, which remains fixed at  1 A . 
This result casts doubt on the notion that precedent is a powerful mechanism to constrain 
judicial arbitrariness. When precedents can be overruled, legal unpredictability is the greatest when 
judicial preferences are polarized.  In a sense, a system of overruling suffers from the very same 
malady it seeks to cure.  Perhaps this point sheds light on the challenges of judicial law-making in 
politically charged cases, where judicial preferences are highly polarized, and legal evolution itself 
becomes a source of the very unpredictability it purports to eliminate.  
  What about the ex ante efficiency of judge-made law?  Does the evolution of precedent lead 
to optimal legal rules?  The benchmark here is  L A , the optimal one-dimensional threshold rule we 
found in section 3.  The following proposition explains when overruling leads to optimality: 
 
Proposition 2:  Under overruling, judge made law is efficient if and only if all judges are unbiased. 
 
In expectation, the law converges to the efficient decision rule  L A  only if there is full agreement 
among judges and their views are aligned with efficiency.  When some judges are biased, there is a   21
chance that the initial precedent is either set by a Pro-O or by a Pro-V judge.  In either case, the law 
does not converge to an efficient rule.  The contribution of efficiency-seeking judges to the 
convergence of common law to efficiency is recognized by Posner (2003), although he does not 
explain just how stringent the conditions for full efficiency are.  
  Proposition 2 restricts the chances that judge-made law is fully efficient, but it does not in 
itself prevent overruling of precedents from being beneficial in an evolutionary sense. It is thus 
important to answer the following question: under overruling of precedents, is there a tendency for 
the law to improve over-time? The next result addresses this question.  
Corollary 1:  Under overruling, expected social losses are (weakly) minimized for +∞ = k . 
 
When people take precautions based on the law of the moment, welfare here is independent 
of k.   The reason is the model’s symmetry: if an efficiency oriented judge overrules a biased 
precedent, then the biased judge will overrule the efficient precedent, creating no overall tendency 
toward efficiency. In particular, efficiency is the same when  0 = k  as when  +∞ = k : in the absence 
of legal change, uncertainty over the bias of the initial judge leads to social losses of  [] ) ( i i A E Λ , the 
same that prevail when  0 = k . Despite such irrelevance, there might be some reasons why, under 
overruling,  +∞ = k  is preferred.  Such values as the predictability of the law or equal treatment may 
render a bad but stable law preferable to an equally efficient on average but unpredictable law.    
The dismal performance of legal evolution under overruling of precedents is due to the 
symmetry of judges´ behavior: by mutually overruling each other, active judges neutralize their 
respective impacts on the law.  For legal change to be desirable, the odds of moving from a bad to a 
good rule, should be greater than those of moving in reverse. 
When would that be the case?  Efficient precedents would be harder to overrule when 
Unbiased judges are more activist than the extremists (have a lower overruling cost  U k ).  This 
might be the case, for example, when judicial ability is positively correlated with both unbiasedness 
and peer respect, which reduces the private cost of legal change:   22
 
Proposition 3:  If  k kU < , there exists  2 ˆ π π ≤  such that, for  [ ] 2 , ˆ π π π ∈ , judge-made law converges 
to efficiency. 
 
When the Unbiased judges are more interventionist than the biased ones ( k kU < ), then not 
only is there a possibility for legal evolution to improve the law, but Posner’s efficiency conjecture 
also holds.  As Proposition 3 shows, the activism of the Unbiased judges is not sufficient for the 
law to converge to full efficiency and a further condition must be met: polarization should not be 
too extreme.  Figure 4 below represents, for a given  2 / 1 < k , the set of π  and  k kU <  where 
overruling leads to full efficiency and where it does not. 










The vertical axis of the diagram measures preference polarization π , the horizontal axis 
measures  [] 1 , 0 / ∈ k kU , the strength of Unbiased judges’ comparative advantage in legal change, 
maximal at  0 = U k  and minimal at  k kU = .  The function  ) / ( ˆ k kU π  shows, for every  U k , the level 
of polarization above which Unbiased judges overrule inefficient precedents.  The dashed area and 
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Just as in Proposition 2, Posner’s conjecture holds – regardless of  U k  – when all judges are 
benevolent ( 1 = π ).  The intriguing feature of Figure 4 is that, in the shaded region above  ) / ( ˆ k kU π , 
the law converges to full efficiency even if only a few judges are Unbiased.  Indeed, when  π π ˆ ≥ , 
Unbiased judges correct inefficient precedents, and when it is also the case that  2 π π ≤ , extremists 
stay passive and do not reverse the efficiency promoting decisions of the Unbiased judges. 
To summarize, if the behavior of different judges is symmetric, there is no tendency for 
overruling of precedents to be beneficial and – if judges’ preferences are very polarized – 
convergence itself is unlikely.  On the other hand, the greater activism of the Unbiased judges 
effectively leads to a virtuous evolution of the law, to the point of vindicating Posner’s conjecture, 
at least when the polarization of judicial preferences is intermediate. 
Our results identify the critical role that efficiency seeking judges play in the convergence 
and efficiency of judge-made law under overruling.  Yet Cardozo’s quote suggests that building the 
law up with incremental dimensions – a feature absent in overruling -- may by itself render the 
evolution of precedent desirable irrespectively of the type of judges engaging in legal change.   
Below we investigate this channel of legal evolution.  
 
5. Distinguishing 
  In the common law tradition, the ability of judges to distinguish cases from previous 
precedent serves an important constructive role.  It allows new information to be considered in 
adjudication, and thereby enables the law to evolve, to adjust to new circumstances, and to become 
more precise.  Such adaptability of common law is seen by writers from Holmes (1897), to Cardozo 
(1921), Hayek (1960), Stone (1985), and Posner (2003) as one of the chief virtues of judge-made 
law.  Here we study such a process of distinguishing cases from precedents, and examine its 
implications for the convergence and efficiency of judge-made legal rules. 
   24
The Form of Legal Change and its Welfare Consequences 
  The utility of a judge who modifies the initial precedent  1 A  (we call him judge 2) by 
introducing the dimension q into the legal rule by the choice of thresholds  0 Q  and  1 Q  is 
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The first term of the expression represents the cost for judge 2 of mistakenly holding O not liable 
(i.e. ruling against V), while the second term is the cost for judge 2 of erroneously holding O liable. 
Define ) 1 /( 2 2 2 β β + = A .   Here  2 A  can be interpreted as the ideal threshold on the dog’s  
aggressiveness that would be chosen by judge 2 if he were setting the initial precedent. From first 
order conditions, we obtain 
(13)       1 2 1 2 , 0 ) 1 ( 1 ) ( A A A Q − − =  
(14)       ) 1 ( ) ( 1 2 1 2 , 1 A A A Q − =  
These reaction functions tell us that some re-equilibrating mechanism is indeed built into 
precedent, because 2 , 0 Q  and  2 , 1 Q  decrease in  1 A .  Regardless of judge 2´s bias, a more Pro-O initial 
rule induces him to use dimension q relatively more in favor of V.  However, since the extent of the 
adjustment depends on the bias of the second judge, summarized by 2 A , we need to carefully 
evaluate the welfare impact of legal change through distinguishing before assessing its desirability.  
The probabilities of different mistakes after precedent change are 
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These expressions show why, contrary to the common wisdom, judges’ biases do not 
balance one another in judge-made law: the ratio of the two errors,  ) Pr( / ) Pr( NL L L NL , is fully 
determined, through 2 A , by the desired bias of the second judge!  When judge 2 introduces q into 
adjudication, he discretionally sets  2 , 0 Q  and  2 , 1 Q  so as to favor the party he prefers.  As a result, 
there is no presumption that the final configuration of the law is less biased than the initial   25
precedent.  Due to the very discretion embodied in distinguishing cases, judge-made law cannot 
eliminate this first effect of judicial bias: it cannot correct the ratio of different errors.   In this sense, 
the eccentricities of judges do not balance one another and judge made law is not a solution to the 
presence of judicial bias. 
  However, in our model, judicial bias also affects the efficiency of the law by affecting the 
overall likelihood of judicial error, i.e. the law’s precision. This channel if very important for 
distinguishing.  Indeed, a very Pro-O judge is willing to design a very imprecise rule in order to 
excuse dog owners, but since he does not want to totally discard the information embodied into the 
existing legal rule, the waste of information associated with his exercise of discretion is limited.  
Generally speaking, the threshold  1 A  set by judge 1 limits the arbitrariness of judge 2 when 




1 ≤ − + A A  in  ) ( L NL P  
and  ) ( NL L P  accounts for this second effect of precedent change. 
The strength of this second effect depends on the extremism of the first judge.  Suppose that 
judge 2 is extremely Pro-O and consider two cases: in the first judge 1 is extremely Pro-V, in the 
second judge 1 is moderate.   In the first case, judge 1 only cares about not excusing the owners of 
any dogs who should be held liable, and therefore sets  1 A = 0.  Since judge 2 only cares about not 
holding liable owners of dogs who efficiently should not be, his optimal choice in light of the 
precedent he faces is to undo the will of judge 1 entirely and set  0 Q =  1 Q = 1.  According to judge 2, 
any provocation, no matter how minor, eliminates dog owner’s liability.  When judge 1 is so 
extreme, judge 2 is both able and willing to move from the regime of strict liability to the regime of 
virtually no liability by distinguishing the case based on provocation.   
Suppose in contrast that judge 1 is moderate, cares about both types of errors, and therefore 
sets  1 A = 1/2.  The Pro-O Judge 2 still can set  0 Q =  1 Q = 1, but he does not want to.  The reason is 
that he can set  0 Q = 1, and  1 Q = 1/2, and this way avoid the error of holding non-liable the owners 
of unprovoked vicious dogs.   He still keeps the area of false liability down to zero, but because he   26
does not like making any errors, his decision is more efficient.  Judge 1’s moderation entails the 
relative moderation of judge 2.  This discussion also shows that our assumption about judicial 
preferences actually matters; if judge 2 only cared about favoring dog owners without regard for 
making errors, he would set   0 Q =  1 Q = 1 regardless of what judge 1 did before him.  To summarize: 
 
Proposition 4: Judge1’s moderation leads to judge 2’s moderation.  
 
How does distinguishing affect social welfare? The tension between the “bias” and 
“imprecision” effect of distinguishing can be gauged by looking at social losses after q  is 
introduced: 
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After judge 2 revises precedent, social loss is a product of two terms. The term ) ( 2 A Λ  stands 
for the social loss under the hypothetical assumption that the initial rule is chosen by judge 2.  This 





1 ) 1 ( A A − +  captures the “precision” effect of initial precedent, which influences judge 2’s 
optimal exercise of discretion, thus reducing social losses.  If the initial threshold on a,  1 A , were not 
binding through stare decisis, the social loss would be entirely determined by the preferences of 
judge 2, as reflected by the hypothetical  2 A .  By comparing (17) with  ) ( 1 A Λ  we find: 
 
Proposition 5: Legal change through distinguishing cases is beneficial when either of the following 
 conditions is met 
  i )   ) ( ) ( 2 1 A A Λ ≥ Λ  




1 ) 1 ( A A − +  is small enough. 
 
Condition i) says that distinguishing is always beneficial when the preferences of judge 2 are 
more efficiency oriented than those of judge 1.  Even if this is not the case, condition ii) says that 
distinguishing may still be beneficial if the greater precision induced by the inclusion of q more   27
than offsets the loss from adversely changing the ratio of different mistakes. Put differently, 
distinguishing is only harmful when two conditions hold simultaneously: judge 2’s preferences, if 
he was hypothetically setting the initial precedent, would yield greater social losses than those of 
judge 1, and also, judge 1’s preferences are sufficiently extreme that his initial decision only 
minimally constrains judge 2’s optimal choice.  Or, to put this more broadly, legal change through 
distinguishing is most likely to be detrimental when both judge 1 and judge 2 are extremists, and 
when judge 2’s extremism is more detrimental to social welfare than that of judge 1. 
  To illustrate how distinguishing can be harmful, we make the following 
Assumption 2:  Judge 1 is Pro-V, with bias λ β < 1 , and judge 2 is Pro-O, with bias λ β > 2 . 
 
Together with Assumption 1 (which posits that under- precautions are socially costlier than over-
precautions), Assumption 2 tells us that the bias of judge 1 is more efficiency oriented than that of 
judge 2, so that  ) ( ) ( 2 1 A A Λ < Λ .   Under Assumption 2, condition i) of Proposition 5 is violated.  In 
this case, distinguishing may be harmful to society as it just represents a way for judge 2 to excuse 
careless owners of very aggressive dogs, whom he is fundamentally sympathetic to, by finding V´s 
provocation.  Such an excuse may be so costly to society as to undermine the desirability of legal 
change through distinguishing cases altogether. 
Overall, our analysis suggests two points.  First, in a system of precedent, the desirability of 
distinguishing and the efficiency of judge-made law depend on judicial bias, particularly on the bias 
of the last judge who changes legal rules.  Legal precedent does not balance the different opinions 
of judges, and its ultimate configuration may be severely inefficient if an “anti-efficiency” judge 
sets it.  Second, the effectiveness of precedent in constraining judges depends on its initial 
configuration: the more biased is the initial rule, the more likely is that the introduction of further 
empirical dimensions is biased as well.  The precision of the law exhibits a strong path dependency. 
  However, just as we saw with overruling, we cannot properly evaluate a system of precedent 
before determining which judges are likely to change the law.   28
Judicial Activism and Distinguishing 
By comparing the utility judge j derives from retaining i A  completely with the utility he 
obtains by introducing his preferred thresholds  j Q0 and  j Q1  into the law (for  i A  given), we find that 
judge j distinguishes  i A  when: 
(18)       k
j i
j i 2









The smaller is the cost k, the greater the chance that a judge changes the law.  For  0 = k , judges 
always distinguish precedents (and introduce  j Q0 and  j Q1 ).  Notice the difference between (18) and 
the condition for overruling.  Just as with overruling, a greater disagreement between judges j and i 
leads the former to distinguish  i A  more often.  However, now there is also an informational gain 
associated to distinguishing.  This gain is stronger for moderate judges ( 1 = j β ) who care most 
about the precision of the law.  Such a gain may induce a judge to distinguish even a precedent set 
by a predecessor with identical preferences. 
To evaluate the properties of distinguishing, we must characterize the activism of different 
judges, in particular their proclivity to change a precedent set by a judge they disagree with.   As in 
Section 3, the polarization of judges´ preferences determines the final configuration of judge-made 
law.  This can be seen clearly for  1 = λ .  Suppose for simplicity that k is high enough that judges do 
not change their preferred initial precedent.  Then there exist two thresholds  2 1
~ ~ π π ≤ , such that for 
1
~ π π < , judges never introduce q into the law and the initial precedent (solely based on a) stays in 
place forever.  At intermediate polarization ( 2 1
~ ~ π π π < ≤ ), Pro-O and Pro-V judges distinguish each 
others´ precedents and the law converges to a two dimensional legal rule unless an Unbiased judge 
sets the initial precedent.  Finally, when polarization is high ( 2
~ π π ≥ ) Unbiased judges stop being 
passive, distinguish precedents set by extremists (and vice-versa), and the law always converges to 
a two-dimensional legal rule.   29
Under distinguishing, the law always converges, at least if there are a finite number of 
empirical dimensions germane to defining a transaction and – which is essentially the same – if the 
nature of transactions does not change over time.  Such long-run predictability hinges on the 
assumption that judges cannot introduce irrelevant dimensions into the law.  In other words, the 
materiality of a dimension is a physical characteristic that even the most biased judges cannot 
subvert. A stare decisis doctrine constraining judges to modify the current precedent only by 
enriching the empirical content of the law is successful in assuring convergence.   
 
6.  The Properties of Judge-Made Law under Distinguishing 
The result that under distinguishing the law converges does not imply that distinguishing is 
an effective constraint on the arbitrariness of judges.  Indeed, all judges now use the same legal rule 
in the long run, but the rule may be very biased because it was set by a biased judge. 
This consideration makes it imperative to evaluate when, under distinguishing, judge-made 
law converges to the optimal two-dimensional rule we analyzed in Section 3.  We then find: 
 
Proposition 6:  There exists a  0
~
> k  such that, under distinguishing judge-made law converges to 
the efficient two-dimensional rule  if and only if all judges are unbiased, 




In the same spirit as Proposition 2, Proposition 6 says that, when judges distinguish cases, a 
population of fully unbiased judges is necessary for judge-made law to converge to the efficient 
two-dimensional rule.  However, two additional conditions must now be fulfilled. 
First, it is essential that judges be interventionist enough to introduce q into the law: this is 
the condition  k k
~
≤ .  If all judges are unbiased but  k k
~
> , the law – just as in the case of overruling 
–  starts out at the optimal one-dimensional rule  L A  and simply stays there. 
  Second, it must be that  1 = λ  (
under over Λ = Λ ), i.e., the optimal rule is unbiased in terms of 
the ratio of different errors.  Recall that Proposition 1 says that, in the optimal two-dimensional rule,   30
F Q , 0  and  F Q , 1  yield the optimal ratio of errors as a function of 
under over Λ Λ / , whereas  2 / 1 = F A  
maximizes the precision of the law independently of 
under over Λ Λ / .  Under distinguishing, even with 
two unbiased judges ruling sequentially, the emerging two-dimensional rule is suboptimal: the 
initial precedent is set at  L A  and not at 1/2 because the first judge disregards the effect of his choice 
on long run law.  Forward looking behavior on this judge’s part would not remove this inefficiency 
unless he is infinitely patient.  Indeed, even if the Unbiased judges distinguish cases more often 
than do the extremists ( k kU < ), we do not expect the law to converge to efficiency  except in the 
knife-edge case where the goal of maximizing the precision of the law and the goal of biasing it 
optimally coincide, i.e. when 
under over Λ = Λ .  In that case, an Unbiased judge sets  2 / 1 1 = A  and, 
provided that an Unbiased judge also introduces q into the law, a fully efficient rule emerges.  
The ambitious normative benchmark used in this section (the optimal two-dimensional rule) 
makes it hard for judge-made law to be efficient, but it also reveals the greater potential of legal 
evolution under distinguishing.  The “technological” advantage of distinguishing over overruling 
arises from the greater precision that new material dimensions bring into the law. 
To fully evaluate the performance of distinguishing, we need to ask whether, regardless of   
the long-run efficiency of the law, there is a tendency for legal change to improve it.  In Section 5, 
we saw that, when under-precautions are relatively costly, a Pro-O judge distinguishing a Pro-V 
precedent may reduce social welfare.  Yet, to properly evaluate legal change, we must consider all 
possible paths of legal evolution.  This leads to the following result: 
 
Corollary 2:  Under distinguishing, the level of k that minimizes social losses accommodates some 
legal change.  In particular,  0 = k  is always socially preferable to  ∞ = k . 
 
This result stands in stark contrast to Corollary 1, which showed that, when judges behave 
symmetrically, under overruling the best outcome is achieved for  +∞ = k .  In that case, frequent 
legal change prevented the law from converging, leading to unpredictability.   31
Legal change is beneficial here because the introduction of q into the law brings an 
informational benefit that on average overpowers the cost of bias.  How this can be the case is best 
seen by looking at expected social losses when  0 = k .  Now every judge distinguishes away the 
initial precedent  i A , leading to second period expected loss of [ ] [ ] ) ( ) 1 (
2 2
j j i i A E A A Λ − + , which – 
as we saw in Proposition 5 – can be larger or smaller than the period 1 loss  ) ( i A Λ .  Along some 
paths (e.g. starting from an efficient  i A ) legal change is likely to be bad, but it is good along others.  
  Averaging the period 2 loss across initial precedents, we find the ex-ante loss: 
(23)       [ ] [ ] ) ( ) 1 (
2 2
j j i i i A E A A E Λ − +  
The ex-ante loss under no legal change is instead  [ ] ) ( i i A E Λ .  Since  [ ] 1 ) 1 (
2 2 ≤ − + i i i A A E , legal 
change is in expectation beneficial and  0 = k  is socially preferred to  ∞ = k .  The fact that the 
benefit of legal change is more readily available when judges are activists yields our final result: 
 
Proposition 7: There exists a k >0 such that, for  k k ≤  distinguishing of precedents is on average 
beneficial. 
 
This result vindicates at least partly Cardozo’s intuition for the presence of a “technological” 
force driving the evolution of precedent toward efficiency despite the vagaries of individual judges. 
When judges embrace legal change (as in the case of  k = 0), their  biases “wash out” and the net 
gain for the law comes from the more accurate information (greater number of empirical 
dimensions) embodied into legal rules.  This creates a tendency for the law to become more 
efficient over time.  This effect is absent when judges overrule prior precedents, since massive legal 
change brings no new data to dispute resolution, and is only a source of unpredictability. 
 
7. Conclusion. 
  When does the evolution of judge-made law through precedent change lead to efficient legal 
rules?  When does such evolution improve the law on average?  We addressed these questions in a   32
legal-realist model, in which deciding judges face opportunities to either overrule the precedent or 
distinguish it from the case before them, but may be both biased and averse to changing the law. 
  We found that, for both overruling and distinguishing, the conditions for ultimate efficiency 
of judge-made law are implausibly stringent.  Indeed, with overruling, legal rules need not even 
converge.  One key case of convergence to full efficiency under overruling occurs when efficiency-
oriented judges are more activist than the biased ones, and the preferences of the biased judges are 
not too polarized.  Yet even though full efficiency is hard to attain, in the case of distinguishing 
there is a strong presumption that the process of legal change raises welfare as it improves the 
informational quality of judicial decision making, at least when the cost of changing the law is low.   
We also found that disagreement among judges is likely to undermine the quality of legal change, 
suggesting that common law is likely to be least efficient in areas where judges strongly disagree.  
  The model in this paper is a first step in the analysis of judge-made law, and omits several 
important aspects of legal evolution.    First, unlike the previous research, we focus on decision-
making by judges, and neglect the selection of disputes for judicial resolution rather than settlement.  
It is far from clear, however, that such selection improves the quality of law, since it may be the 
combination of extremist litigants and judges that leads to legal change.   
Second, we have ignored the important fact that judges make decisions in panels, which 
could in principle moderate polarization of their views, and lead to better law.  However, as shown 
by Revesz (1997) and Sunstein et al. (2004), panels sometimes lead to the convergence of member 
views to the bias of the majority, rather than to a moderate compromise.  Collective decision 
making does not then reduce polarization, so crucial to the efficiency of legal change.  
Third, we have presented an extremely limited model of judicial leeways, in which only one 
verifiable material dimension can be added to the judicial consideration of a dispute.  In reality, 
there are many such dimensions and, moreover, some of them include complex issues such as 
causality or knowledge.  According to Stone (1985), the flexibility of language offers appellate 
judges tremendous leeway in distinguishing cases and rewriting the law.   This leeway may offer   33
considerable benefits when the law evolves toward efficiency, but it can also slow down legal 
change, or turn it in bad directions, when used by judges uninterested in efficiency. 
Fourth, we have focused on judicial discretion in making new laws under the assumption 
that the facts of the case are verifiable.  However, as argued by Frank (1930, 1951), Stone (1985) 
and Posner (1990), judges can also manipulate their interpretation of the facts, by emphasizing 
some aspects of the evidence and neglecting others, thereby reaching the outcomes they desire 
through fact-discretion rather than changes in the law.  Such fact-discretion in itself many 
undermine the efficiency of the law, but is also likely to slow the pace of legal change, as judges 
choose to “work on” the facts rather than to rewrite precedents.  For this reason, fact-discretion is 
one of the crucial challenges in the analysis of legal evolution.   
As a final note, we emphasize that ours is a theoretical analysis of the propositions that legal 
change in a system or precedent is beneficial, and that the law converges to efficiency.  Posner’s 
hypotheses, however, are empirical propositions, and as such cannot be rejected by theory.   We 
have tried to develop several testable implications of our analysis, which might make it possible to 
identify the areas of the law where Posner’s hypothesis is more likely to hold.    These hypotheses 
may be easier to verify empirically than the broad propositions about the efficiency of common law. 
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Hessian is positive definite). Thus, solving the first order conditions for ( F A ,  O Q ,  1 Q ), namely 
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Proof of Proposition 2. Judge j overrules  i A  with  j A  when  k A U A U i j j j ≥ − ) ( ) (.   j A  minimizes 
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over under Λ Λ .  Judge j overrules when 















Under these judicial preferences, judicial behavior is symmetric: if π  is such that j overrules  i A  it 
is also the case that i overrules  j A .  Such symmetric behavior in turn implies that unless  1 = γ  or 
1 = π  (i.e., all judges are unbiased), there exists no k such that precedent converges to  L A .♠ 
 
Proof of Corollary 1. Let us analyze judges´ behavior by studying the functions  ) ( , π j i f . Their 
symmetric behavior considerably restricts the number of cases that we need to look at. 
a) Pro-O ( πλ β = i ); Pro-V ( π λ β / = i ).  Now 
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c) Pro-V ( π λ β / = i ); Unbiased ( λ β = i ).  Now 
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= = V U U V f f . 
The function  ) ( , π i j f  increases in π , starting at  0 ) 1 ( , = j i f . Moreover,  1 ) ( , = ∞ V O f , 
2
, ) 1 /( 1 ) ( λ + = ∞ U O f , 
2 2
, ) 1 /( ) ( λ λ + = ∞ U V f .  Call  [ ) { } ∞ + ∪ +∞ ∈ , 1 ,i j π  the level of π  above which 
j overrules i (and vice-versa).  We define  +∞ = j i, π  when there exist no π  such that i and j overrule 
each other (for instance  +∞ = O U, π  if 
2 ) 1 /( 1 λ + > k ).  Notice that for  1 ≤ λ ,  U V U O V O , , , π π π ≤ ≤ .  If 
2 / 1 > k , precedent does not change from its initial configuration; otherwise there will be legal 
change provided π  is large enough and the law does not converge.  At  0 = k , judges always 
overrule precedents. In this case, expected social losses are given by     35
[] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( O O B B V V i i A A A A E Λ + Λ + Λ ≡ Λ α α α , where  V A ,  B A ,  O A  are the preferred rules of Pro-V, 
Benevolent and Pro-O judges, respectively.  If  +∞ → k , the initial precedent sticks forever, and 
expected social losses are  [] ) ( i i A E Λ .  Thus,  0 = k  and  +∞ = k  are equally desirable from a welfare 
standpoint.  This is also the case for intermediate k’s, as the symmetry in judicial behavior makes 
different patterns of legal change irrelevant for social welfare: the effect of judge j on law  i A  set by 
judge i is exactly neutralized by the effect of judge i on the law set by judge j ( j A ).  Finally, for the 
purpose of Table 1 and its discussion, re-label  U V U O V O , 3 , 2 , 1 , , π π π π π π = = = .♠ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. Efficiency is attained if Unbiased judges set  L A  without being overruled 
by extremists.  This happens if  U O, π π < , which is necessary for  L A  to stay in place.  The law can 
converge to  L A  either if Unbiased  judges overrule all extremists, i.e. when  U V, π π ≥  where 
U U V U V k f = ) ( , , π , or if Unbiased judges overrule only Pro-O ones, but at the same time Pro-O 
overrule  Pro-V. This event happens when  [ ] U O V O O , , , max π π π π ≡ ≥  ( U U O O U k f = ) ( , , π ). Call 
[ ] U V O , , min ˆ π π π = .  Then, if  [ ) U O, , ˆ π π π ∈ , the law converges to  L A .  Clearly, it is always the case 
that  U O, ˆ π π ≤ .  In order to draw figure 4, suppose that 
2 ) 1 ( 2 / 1 0 λ + < < k , k  fixed.  Define now the 
variable  [] 1 , 0 / ∈ k kU . ) / ( ˆ k kU π  starts at  1 ) 0 ( ˆ = π , ends at  1 ) 1 ( ˆ , > = U O π π  and it increases 
continuously in  k kU /. ♠ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. We say that judge 2 is more moderate under 
'
1 A  than under  1 A  if, given his 
bias  2 β  – fully translated in the ratio between different errors under the two-dimensional rule – the 
imprecision of the law (i.e. the sum of different errors) is smaller under 
'
1 A .  Judge 2´s moderation 
is maximized at  ) 2 / 1 ( 1 = A , when judge 1 is maximally moderate, and minimized at  0 1 = A  or 
1 1 = A , (when judge 1 is fully biased).♠ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5. After  1 A , judge 2 minimizes the expression for social losses where 
) , ( , , j O j V β β  replace  ) , (
over under Λ Λ for given  1 A . Under the new (two-dimensional) rule, expected 




1 2 , 1 2 , 0 1 A A A Q Q A Λ − + = Λ , as opposed to the level  ) ( 1 A Λ  under  1 A . 
Proposition 5 follows directly by comparing these two magnitudes.♠ 
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Proof of Proposition 6. Judge j distinguishes precedent  i A  by introducing q into the law when 
k A U Q Q A U i j j j i j ≥ − ) ( ) , , ( , 1 , 0 .  j j Q Q , 1 , 0 ,  minimize, for given  i A , the expression for social losses 
where  ) , ( , , j O j V β β  replaces  ) , (
over under Λ Λ .  Then, j distinguishes  i A  when 















Notice that judicial behavior is symmetric: if π  is such that j distinguishes  i A , then it is also the 
case that i distinguishes  j A .  By the logic of Proposition 2, such symmetry implies that unless 
1 = γ , the bias of the law is not efficient.  With distinguishing,  1 = γ  is not enough for efficiency.  
If  1 = γ  and k=0 the law converges to 
2
1 1 0 ) 1 /( , 1 ), 1 /( λ λ λ λ + = − = + = Q Q Q A , which is efficient 
only if  1 = λ .  Finally it must be that judges introduce q into the law, i.e. that  U U h k k , ) 2 / 1 (
~
≡ ≤ .♠ 
 
Proof of Corollary 2. Let us analyze judges´ behavior by studying the functions  ) ( , π j i h .  Given 
symmetry, we must only consider the following cases 
a) Pro-O ( πλ β = i ); Pro-O ( πλ β = i ).  Now 
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≡ V V h . 
c) Unbiased ( λ β = i ); Unbiased ( λ β = i ).  Now 
4
2






≡ U U h . 
d) Pro-O ( πλ β = i ); Pro-V ( π λ β / = i ).  Now
2 2
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≡ ≡ O V V O h h . 
e) Pro-O ( πλ β = i ); Unbiased ( λ β = i ).  Now 
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≡ ≡ O U U O h h . 
f) Pro-V ( π λ β / = i ); Unbiased ( λ β = i ).  Now 
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≡ ≡ V U U V h h . 
If  i j ≠ ,  ) ( , π i j h  is increasing,  U U i j h h , , ) 1 ( = ,  1 ) ( , = ∞ V O h , 
2
, ) 1 /( 1 ) ( λ + = ∞ U O h , 
2 2
, ) 1 /( ) ( λ λ + = ∞ U V h . 
) ( , π j j h  is decreasing, 
2 2
, ) 1 /( 2 ) 1 ( λ λ + = j j h , 0 ) ( ) ( , , = ∞ = ∞ V V O O h h . Some rankings in the  ) ( , π i j h  
are:  ) ( min ) ( , , π π i j i j U V h h
≠ = ,  ) ( min ) ( , , π π i i j V V h h = ,  ) ( max ) ( , , π π i i
i
U O h h ≥ . Disagreement tends to be 
a stronger incentive for distinguishing than information ( ) ( max ) ( max , , π π i i i j i i j h h ≥
≠ ). As π  gets 
sufficiently large (and for  1 = λ ), the ranking becomes  V V O O U U U V U O V O h h h h h h , , , , , , ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ .  In   37
the spirit of Proposition 2, define  [ ) { } ∞ + ∪ +∞ ∈ , 1 ,i j π  (above  i j, π  j distinguishes i and vice-versa. 
Under the above ranking  V V O O U U U V U O V O , , , , , , π π π π π π ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  (for every k ).  By reducing k  
social welfare need not go up.  If k  is set such that at the current level of π ,  U V U O , , π π π < < , 
social losses are  [ ] O V O U V V U U O x x L Λ − + Λ + Λ + Λ − = θ γ γθ θ γ ) 1 )( 2 / 1 ( ) 1 )( 2 / 1 ( ˆ , with 
2 2 ) 1 ( i i i A A − + = θ ,  ) ( i i A Λ = Λ ,  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ), 1 /( 2 γ γ γ γ + − = + = V U x x . We could have  ) ( ˆ
i i E L Λ ≥ , 
i.e. legal change reduces welfare. Yet, for some k  legal change raises welfare.  If  U O V O , , π π π < <  
legal change is good, as  ) ( ) 1 )( 2 / 1 ( ) 1 )( 2 / 1 ( i i O V U V O E Λ ≤ Λ − + Λ + Λ − θ γ γ θ γ . Clearly,  0 = k  is 
preferred to  ∞ = k , as  ) ( ) ( ) ( i i i i i i E E E Λ ≤ Λ θ . For the discussion in the text, relabel 
2 , 1 , ~ ; ~ π π π π = = U O V O .♠ 
 
Proof of Proposition 7. Define 
4 2
, ) 1 /( 2 ) 1 ( λ λ + = = j i h k . If  k k ≤ , judges  i j ≠  and  U i j = = , 
distinguish  i A  (they would do it at  1 = π ).  For  i j = ,  V O i , =  judges can either be active or not.  If 
Pro-O become active welfare goes down ( ) ( i O E Λ ≥ Λ ). For  k k ≤ , legal change is good if it is 
good when only Pro-O are active.  If  ) ( i V E Λ ≥ Λ  (i.e. the activism of Pro-V reduces welfare), then 
legal change is good for  k k ≤ , as adding to the activism of Pro-O the harmful one of Pro-V leads 
to the same as  0 = k . If  ) ( i V E Λ < Λ  one finds after some algebra that legal change is good if: 
[] V V i V U O E Λ − ≤ Λ − − + + − θ γ θ γ γθ θ γ
2 ) 1 )( 2 / 1 ( ) ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 2 / 1 ( . This certainly holds if legal 
change is good when  ) ( i V E Λ = Λ . This is indeed the case because if  ) ( i V E Λ = Λ , social losses are 
the same as under  0 = k .   38
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